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Abstract
We have demonstrated a proof-of-principle experiment of reference-frame-independent phase
coding quantum key distribution (RFI-QKD) over an 80-km optical fiber. After considering
the finite-key bound, we still achieve a distance of 50 km. In this scenario, the phases of the
basis states are related by a slowly time-varying transformation. Furthermore, we developed and
realized a new decoy state method for RFI-QKD systems with weak coherent sources to counteract
the photon-number-splitting attack. With the help of a reference-frame-independent protocol and
a Michelson interferometer with Faraday rotator mirrors, our system is rendered immune to the
slow phase changes of the interferometer and the polarization disturbances of the channel, making
the procedure very robust.
PACS numbers:
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To ensure the security of sensitive data transmission, a series of keys must be securely
transmitted between distant users, referred to here as Alice and Bob. Recently, the quantum
key distribution (QKD)[1, 2] has become useful for distributing secret keys securely. The
use of QKD over fibers and free space has been demonstrated many times[3–5]. Currently,
there are even commercial QKD systems available[6–8].
In most QKD systems, a shared reference frame between Alice and Bob is required. For
example, the alignment of polarization states for polarization encoding QKD or interfero-
metric stability for phase encoding QKD plays an important role in those systems. Although
alignment operations have been shown to be feasible, they do require a certain amount of
time and cost to perform. As an alternative, Laing et al. proposed a reference-frame-
independent (RFI) protocol[9] to eliminate the requirement of alignment. This protocol
uses three orthogonal bases (X , Y and Z), in which the X and Y bases are used to estimate
Eve’s information, and the Z basis is used to obtain the raw key. The states in the Z basis,
such as the time-bin eigen-states, are naturally well-aligned, whereas the states in X and
Y are superpositions of the eigen-states in Z. RFI-QKD could be very useful in several
scenarios, such as earth-to-satellite QKD and path-encoded chip-to-chip QKD [9]. However,
real-life RFI-QKD systems are vulnerable to the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [10–
12]because a weak coherent light source is usually used instead of a single-photon source.
To our knowledge, there has not yet been an experimental demonstration of RFI-QKD in a
long-distance fiber, performed in a way that is secure against a PNS attack[13].
However, in the RFI protocol, we must use a finite number of signals to estimate the
optimal secure key rate. If Alice and Bob wait for too long, our result will be bad due to
misalignment of the frames. Hence, we must consider this protocol in finite-key scenarios.
A method for estimating key rate has been described in [26].
In this letter, a new data analysis method for decoy states in the RFI-QKD protocol is
proposed. We provide an experimental demonstration of RFI-QKD with the decoy method.
The secure key bits can be generated by our system with up to a 50-km quantum channel
distance in finite-key scenarios.
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Results
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS WITH DECOY STATES
Review of the protocol
The encoding in RFI-QKD is very similar to the six states protocol [14]. We denote
that |0〉 and |1〉 consist of the Z basis, |+〉 = (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2 and |−〉 = (|0〉 − |1〉)/√2
consist of the X basis, |+ i〉 = (|0〉+ i|1〉)/√2 and | − i〉 = (|0〉 − i|1〉)/√2 consist of the Y
basis. For simplicity, we define XA(B), YA(B) and ZA(B) as Alice(Bob)’s local measurement
frames for the X , Y and Z bases respectively. In a QKD experiment with well-aligned
measurement frames, Alice and Bob should make sure that XA = XB = σX , YA = YB = σY ,
ZA = ZB = σZ , in which σX , σY , and σZ are Pauli operators. However, meeting this
requirement may not be easy. One can imagine that |0〉 and |1〉 are time-bin eigen-states,
and further assume that the quantum channel or interferometer introduces an unknown and
slowly time-varying phase β between |0〉 and |1〉. This implies the following:
ZA = ZB, (1)
XB = cos βXA + sin βYA, (2)
YB = cos βYA − sin βXA. (3)
In each round, Alice chooses one of the encoding states and sends it to Bob through the
quantum channel, and Bob measures the incoming photon with XB, YB or ZB, chosen
at random. After running the protocol for the appropriate number of rounds N , we can
calculate the bit error rate for the ZAZB basis:
EZZ =
1− 〈ZAZB〉
2
. (4)
Here, β should be nearly constant during the N trials. C is used to estimate Eve’s informa-
tion:
C = 〈XAXB〉2 + 〈XAYB〉2 + 〈YAXB〉2 + 〈YAYB〉2. (5)
In a practical QKD system, usually EZZ ≤ 15.9%, so the secret key bit rate is R = 1 −
h(EZZ)− IE , where h(x) is the Shannon entropy function. Eve’s information IE is given by
IE = (1− EZZ)h(1 + vmax
2
)− EZZh(1 + f(vmax)
2
), (6)
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in which,
vmax = min[
1
1 −EZZ
√
C/2, 1], (7)
f(vmax) =
√
C/2− (1−EZZ)2v2max/EZZ . (8)
Decoy states method for the RFI-QKD system
The results mentioned above are based on the use of a single-photon source. Practical
QKD implementations using a weak coherent light source must also use the decoy states
method to overcome a PNS attack in a long-distance scenario [15–17]. However, the original
decoy states method cannot be applied to the RFI system directly. Here, we discuss how to
develop decoy states for RFI-QKD implementations.
Assume that Alice randomly modulates the weak coherent laser pulses with three mean
photon numbers µ, ν (µ > ν) and 0, which are called signal, decoy, and vacuum pulses,
respectively. For every intensity, Alice and Bob perform the RFI-QKD protocol, and then
they obtain the counting rates Yµ, Yν , and Y0 for signal pulses, decoy pulses and vacuum
pulses, respectively. Alice and Bob also obtain the error rates EµZZ , Eµxy and Eνxy, (where
x, y = X, Y ). For example, EµXY represents the error rate of key bits generated in the
case that Alice prepares signal pulses under the X basis while Bob measures the incoming
states with the Y basis. According to decoy theory [16], the secret key bits rate R can be
calculated as follow:
R = −Yµh(EµZZ) + µe−µyL1 (1− IE), (9)
Here, yL1 is the lower bound of the counting rate of the single-photon pulses, and IE is Eve’s
information for sifted key bits. Yµ and EµZZ are directly observed in the experiment, and
yL1 is given by the following equation [20]:
yL1 =
−ν2eµYµ + µ2eνYν − (µ2 − ν2)Y0
µ(µν − ν2) . (10)
The next step is to calculate IE according to (6) or its upper bound. The upper bound of
IE is related to c
L
1 , which is defined as the lower bound of C for the single-photon pulses.
The upper bound of IE also depends on the upper bound of the error rate of the key bits
generated by single-photon pulses under the ZZ basis eU1zz. According to decoy theory, the
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following equality applies:
eU1ZZ =
EµZZYµ − 12e−µY0
µe−µyL1
. (11)
The challenge is to estimate cL1 by using Eµxy and Eνxy. For simplicity, without loss of
generality, we assume that Eµxy > 1/2 and Eνxy > 1/2 for all x, y (if not, Bob can simply
flip his bits corresponding to the relevant basis x, y). There are two ways to calculate cL1 :
1. Using the same method as in the original decoy states, as follows:
EµxyYµ =
1
2
e−µY0 + e1xyµe
−µy1 +
∑
n>2
enxy
µne−µ
n!
yn, (12)
Here, enxy (x, y = X, Y ) denotes the error rate for the key bits generated by n photon pulses
under the x, y basis, yn represents the counting rate of n photon states. Assuming that
enxy = 1(n > 2), we obtain that the lower bound of e1xy
eL1xy = 1−
(1− Eµxy)Yµ − 12e−µY0
µe−µyL1
. (13)
Next, cL1 is given by c
L
1 = α+β, where, α = (1−2Max(1/2, eL1XX))2+(1−2Max(1/2, eL1XY ))2,
β = (1− 2Max(1/2, eL1Y X))2 + (1− 2Max(1/2, eL1Y Y ))2. Below, we describe the second way
to calculate cL1 .
2. We note that
EµXXYµ =
1
2
e−µY0 + e1XXµe
−µy1 +
∑
n>2
enXX
µne−µ
n!
yn, (14)
and,
EµXY Yµ =
1
2
e−µY0 + e1XY µe
−µy1 +
∑
n>2
enXY
µne−µ
n!
yn. (15)
However, enXX and enXY are not independent. We assume that Bob obtains some arbitrary
two-dimensional density matrices ρ+ and ρ− after Alice prepares and sends |+〉 and |−〉,
respectively, through the quantum channel. As described in Ref. [18], Alice and Bob’s raw
key bits are at first distributed in an unbiased fashion (if not, Alice and Bob can perform
some classical randomization operations). Thus, it is not restrictive to assume that Eve
symmetrizes Alice and Bob’s raw key bits, because Eve does not lose any information in
this step. Specifically, she can flip Alice and Bob’s encoding scheme with a probability of
one-half, which is represented as follows:
enXX =
〈−|ρ+|−〉+ 〈+|ρ−|+〉
2
. (16)
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Note that the symmetrization step can also be applied by Alice and Bob in our security
analysis. With the help of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we can reformulate the equation:
enXY =
〈−i|ρ+| − i〉+ 〈+i|ρ−|+ i〉
2
=
1− Im(〈+|ρ+|−〉)− Im(〈−|ρ−|+〉)
2
6
1
2
+
∣∣〈+|ρ+|−〉∣∣+ ∣∣〈−|ρ−|+〉∣∣
2
=
1
2
+
√∣∣〈+|ρ+|−〉∣∣∣∣〈−|ρ+|+〉∣∣+
√∣∣〈+|ρ−|−〉∣∣∣∣〈−|ρ−|+〉∣∣
2
6
1
2
+
√∣∣〈+|ρ+|+〉∣∣∣∣〈−|ρ+|−〉∣∣+
√∣∣〈+|ρ−|+〉∣∣∣∣〈−|ρ−|−〉∣∣
2
6
1
2
+
√
enXX(1− enXX),
(17)
Here, Im(x) represents the imaginary part of a real number x. Therefore, we obtain the
following:
enXX + enXY 6
1
2
+ enXX +
√
enXX(1− enXX)
6 1.70711.
(18)
By adding equations (14) and (15) and applying the above inequality, we find that
e1XX + e1XY >
1.70711− (1.70711− EµXX − EµXY )Yµ − 0.70711e
−µY0
µe−µyL1
, a.
(19)
In the same manner, we find that
e1Y X + e1Y Y >
1.70711− (1.70711− EµY X − EµY Y )Yµ − 0.70711e
−µY0
µe−µyL1
, b
(20)
With these equations, it is easy to show that cL1 = α
′ + β ′, where, α′ = 2(1 − a)2 and
β ′ = 2(1− b)2.
Thus, the optimal lower bound of c1 is given by:
cL1 = Max{α, α′}+Max{β, β ′}. (21)
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This allows us to decide how to evaluate the secure key rate R through the decoy states
method: 1. With counting rates Yµ, Yν and Y0, one can obtain y
L
1 by using inequality (10).
2. With yL1 and error rate EµZZ , e
U
1ZZ is estimated by inequality (11). 3. With the error
rates Eµxy (x, y = X, Y ) and counting rates y
L
1 , Y0, we obtain c
L
1 by using inequality (21).
4. We calculate the upper-bound of IE based on e
U
1ZZ and c
L
1 using the following equations:
IE = (1− eU1ZZ)h(
1 + vmax
2
)− eU1ZZh(
1 + f(vmax)
2
), (22)
in which,
vmax = min[
1
1 − eU1ZZ
√
cL1 /2, 1], (23)
f(vmax) =
√
cL1 /2− (1− eU1ZZ)2v2max/eU1ZZ . (24)
5. Finally, the secure key rate R can be found using equation (9). This method is applicable
to the asymptotic situation. For the finite-key case, we can see that EµZZ and Eµxy must
be modified before we calculate IE.
Finite-key bound
We use the method for computing the finite-key RIF-QKD bound described in [26]. pZ
is the probability that Alice and Bob choose the Z basis. We assume that the other two
bases are chosen with equal probability pX = pY = p. As shown previously (5), there are
four measurements needed to estimate C, they are EµXY (x, y = X, Y ). For simplicity, and
without loss of generality, we assume Eµxy > 1/2 and Eνxy > 1/2 for all x, y (if not, Bob
can simply flip his bits corresponding to the relevant basis x, y).
Experimentally, each value of Eµxy is estimated using m = Np
2 signals. The raw key
consists of n = Np2Z signals. As shown previously [26], under the finite-key scenario, we can
correct EµZZ and Eµxy as E
′
µZZ = EµZZ+δ(n) and E
′
µxy = max{1/2, Eµxy−δ(m)/2}, where
δ(k) =
√
ln(1/εPE) + 2 ln(k + 1)
2k
, (25)
and max{a, b} yields the lesser value of a or b.
The key generation rate per pulse against collective attacks is given by [26]:
rN,col = −Yµh(E ′µZZ) + µe−µyL1 (1− IE)−
n
N
(
1
n
log
2
εEC
− 2
n
log
1
εPA
− 7
√
log(2/ε¯)
n
) (26)
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In this article, we set εPE = εPA = εEC = ε¯ = 10
−5. To obtain the correct IE in the
finite-key case, we simply use the method described in the previous section, except that we
must adopt E ′µZZ , E
′
µxy instead of EµZZ , Eµxy as the effective parameters to calculate IE
according to (22). Finally, the secure key rate rN,col for the finite-key case can be estimated
by (26).
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS
The phase coding method was used in our system, and the experimental setup is shown
in Fig. 1.
The light pulses generated by Alice’s coherent light source are randomly modulated into
three intensities of decoy states using an intensity modulator (IM). Then, the quantum states
of photons are modulated by a Michelson interferometer with a Faraday rotator mirror (FMI)
according to the coding information. Light pulses are attenuated to the single-photon level by
a precisely calibrated attenuator before they enter the quantum channel. An SMF-28 single-
mode fiber with an attenuation of 0.20dB/km is used as a quantum channel between Alice
and Bob. To demodulate the information, Bob needs to make measurements of the arriving
photons on a randomly and independently selected basis, in which the basis definitions of X ,
Y , and Z are the same as those for Alice. There are three possible time-bins of the photons
arriving at Bob’s single photon detectors (SPD) because there are two FMIs in the system.
The SPDs are operating in Geige mode, and their effective gating windows are precisely
aligned at the second time-bin.
The FMI used in this system can self-compensate for polarization fluctuations caused by
disturbances in the quantum channel [27]. The quantum states are randomly modulated
with the coding of paths and relative phases of photons. In each arm of the FMI, a variable
optical attenuator (VOA) acts as the on-off switch to restrain the path of photons, and the
relative phases of photons can be controlled by the phase modulator (PM) of the FMI.
In this system, the X, Y and Z bases are chosen to be ((|0〉+ei0|1〉)/√2, (|0〉+eipi|1〉)/√2),
((|0〉 + e ipi2 |1〉)/√2, (|0〉 + e i3pi2 |1〉)/√2) and (|0〉, |1〉). The coding method for these is as
follows: 1) If basis Z is chosen, only one of the two VOAs in Alice’s FMI is switched on
to allow photons to pass through. Specifically, the time-bin eigen-state |0〉 or |1〉 will be
determined when Alice switches on the long or the short arm of her FMI, respectively. In
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this circumstance, Bob can generate his key as long as the detector clicks. That is the code
for Alice must be 0 when Bob’s code is 1, and vice versa. 2) If basis X or Y is chosen, the
two arms of Alice’s FMI will be switched on simultaneously, and photons will pass through
the two arms with equal probability. The relative phases of the photons can be values from
this set: {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2}. The values {0, pi} correspond to the X basis, and {pi/2, 3pi/2}
correspond to the Y basis.
In Fig. 2, the variation of β is random and relatively slow. Every β corresponds to a
group of QBER values: Eµxx, Eµxy, Eµyx and Eµyy. We performed counts on 10,000 groups
of data, and then plotted the distribution of QBER values in Figure. 3. This figure reveals
the random variation in β between Alice and Bob, and it also shows our experimental data,
measured for the case in which β is universally randomly varying .
Fig. 4(a) shows the key generation rate per pulse only for decoy states and compares the
rates with those of Fig. 4(b) by using finite-key analysis. In finite-key analysis, being able
to calculate the secret key rate by our protocol depends strongly on the number of quantum
signals sent in the stationary segment. Hence, the key rate for three different stationary
segments is shown in Fig. 5. In the 5-s case, the number of signals is approximately 15,000
at 0 km, and because this number is small, the finite key effect is strong. Using the same
experimental parameters and estimation techniques, the key generation rate of our scheme
is similar to the expected value under the RIF scheme. In our experiment, EZZ was mainly
derived from the dark counts of detectors(e.g. approximately 0.0035 at 0 km and 0.016 at
50 km). More detailed data are shown in Table 1 and Table 2.
Discussion
In summary, we have experimentally demonstrated a phase coding RFI-QKD system that
uses the decoy states method. The system can generate secure key bits via an 80-km optical
fiber, and it can effectively resist PNS attacks. In addition, when we consider the finite-key
bound, we can obtain secure key bits via a 50-km optical fiber. Our system is intrinsically
stable in a slowly varying environment without active alignment, and it benefits from the
polarization stability of the FMI. With initiatives for practical QKD underway, we believe
that this experiment is timely and that it will bring such QKD systems into practical use.
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Methods
Device description and experimental setup. In this experiment, we use a homemade
laser that can emit 1449.85nm weak coherent pulses with a 700ps pulse width and a 0.052nm
line width. The FMIs in both Alice and Bob’s sites have the same arm-length difference
2m, to ensure that the time slots of the pulses after the FMIs can be separated completely.
The circulator of Bob’s system cannot only be used to regulate the light path coupled to
one of two SPDs, but it can also be used to resist Trojan horse attacks. The intensities of
the signal, decoy, and vacuum states are µ = 0.6, ν = 0.2 and 0, respectively, and the pulse
number ratio is 6:2:1. The single-photon avalanche detectors in our experiment are the id200
model of id Quantique. The dark count probabilities of the detectors, after-pulse probability
and detection efficiency, are approximately 4× 10−5/gate, 0.358% and 11%, respectively.
We use a personal computer (PC) to control Alice and Bob simultaneously. The entire
system is synchronized at 1MHz. The major limitation comes from the rising and falling
times of the commercially available VOAs, which take approximately 250nm to switch from
maximum to minimum attenuation. The master clock of the system is generated by a
PCI-6602 Data Acquisition (DAQ) card (National Instruments) at Alice’s site, and it is
distributed to Bob through a DG535 delayer (Stanford Research Systems) for accurate syn-
chronization. A PCI-6602 DAQ Card is used to trigger the laser and another DAQ Card
USB-6353. The random numbers used to select the basis and states are generated by a soft-
ware pseudo-random number generator and then transformed to a hardware control signal
by a USB-6353 card. The USB-6353 card also records the single-photon detection events
from the SPDs, and the collected raw data are transferred to the PC for basis sifting and
post processing.
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TABLE I: . Detailed experimental results for Fig. 4(a). (RD is calculated with decoy states but
without the finite key effect. SEMRD is the standard error of the mean of the secure key generation
rate per pulse RD.)
L(km) 0 25 50 65 75 80 85
RD 5.474 × 10−3 1.468 × 10−3 3.238 × 10−4 9.484 × 10−5 8.223 × 10−6 1.117 × 10−6 0
SEMRD 5.752 × 10−5 2.276 × 10−5 1.186 × 10−6 8.132 × 10−7 5.783 × 10−7 4.592 × 10−7 0
TABLE II: . Key generation rate per pulse corresponding to Fig.4(b) and Fig.5.
L(km) 0 25 35 45 50 60 65
5s 1.307 × 10−3 0 0 0 0 0 0
50s 3.869 × 10−3 6.984 × 10−4 2.819 × 10−4 2.227 × 10−5 5.967 × 10−6 0 0
200s 4.442 × 10−3 1.025 × 10−3 5.054 × 10−4 2.061 × 10−4 9.175 × 10−5 9.009 × 10−6 3.276 × 10−7
14
FIG. 1: (color online). The experimental setup of the reference-frame-independent quantum
key distribution system with decoy states. Channel attenuation is 0.20dB/km. The arm-length
difference of the FMI is 2m.
15
FIG. 2: (color online). Three orthogonal states in the phase coding methods. (a) For the X
(yellow arrows) and Y (blue arrows) bases, we use |0〉 + e(iφ)|1〉 to express the states. |0〉 and |1〉
represent the paths that the pulses travel. |0〉 is the short arm, |1〉 is the long arm. φ is the phase
information (b) for the Z (red arrows) basis, which is expressed as |0〉 or |1〉. β in our system is a
time-varying phase between Alice and Bob.
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FIG. 3: (color online). Distribution of all QBER values in our experiment. QBER values are
distributed between 0 and 1. The count of QBER n (0 < n ≤ 1) represents the summation of
values ranging from n− 0.005 to n.
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FIG. 4: (color online). Calculation (line) and measurement (symbols) of secure key generation
rate per pulse with decoy states as a function of channel length. (a) and (b) both use data collected
in 50 seconds to calculate the C value. At 0 km, n ≈ m ≈ 142, 937, Eµzz ≈ 0.0035. (a) Without
finite-key analysis, (b) With finite-key analysis.
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FIG. 5: (color online). Calculation (line) and measurement (symbols) of key generation rate
per pulse with decoy states for three different numbers of signals. We collected data in different
stationary time segments to perform calculations with the same system frequency (from top to
bottom: (a) 200 seconds, (b) 50 seconds and (c) 5 seconds).
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